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585 
BOOK REVIEW OF ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, AN 
HISTORICAL-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPEACHMENTS 
OF PRESIDENTS ANDREW JOHNSON, RICHARD NIXON AND 




Arnold H. Leibowitz has written a provocative and absorbing 
book about Presidential impeachment.1  Leibowitz has had a distin-
guished career as both an attorney and an author, writing extensively 
about territories affiliated with the United States in the Pacific and 
Caribbean, many of which he represented before the United States 
government.2 
While the literature on Presidential impeachment is not 
skimpy,3 what Leibowitz brings to the table is sharp criticism of the 
 
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 
1 ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, AN HISTORICAL-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPEACHMENTS OF 
PRESIDENTS ANDREW JOHNSON, RICHARD NIXON, AND WILLIAM CLINTON: WHY THE PROCESS 
WENT WRONG (2012). 
2 See, e.g., ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, COLONIAL EMANCIPATION IN THE PACIFIC AND 
CARIBBEAN: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1976); ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING 
STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989); 
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, EMBATTLED ISLAND: PALAU’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1996); 
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY LANGUAGE 
GROUPS (1982).  Leibowitz has been General Counsel of the United States Commission on 
the Status of Puerto Rico, counsel to the Guam and Virgin Islands constitutional conven-
tions, and special legal counsel to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Prob-
lems. 
3 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (3d prtg. 1974); H. LOWELL BROWN, 
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (2010); MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000); PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN 
AMERICA, 1635-1805 (1984); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC 
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); EMILY 
FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT (1999).  There also is a shelf of other books concentrating on 
particular Presidential impeachment efforts, judicial impeachments, and impeachments gen-
erally. 
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use of the process.  He argues that, in each of the three Presidential 
impeachment efforts, the process was not worth the damage done not 
only to the Presidency, but to the body politic as well.4  In place of 
impeachment, Leibowitz would employ the weapon of a formal, bi-
partisan resolution of censure.5 
Leibowitz argues that the Framers of the United States Con-
stitution saw impeachment as an extraordinary remedy that would not 
be tainted by partisanship,6 but complicated the process by not defin-
ing “high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors.”7  Leibowitz argues that in 
all three cases in which Congress became involved in the impeach-
ment process—Andrew Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Bill Clin-
ton—partisan politics infected every aspect of the process.8  
Leibowitz believes that the public interest in having a fully function-
ing President is so great that impeachment is rarely, if ever, warrant-
ed.9  It will be seen that this reviewer, while respecting the author and 
finding the book stimulating, deeply disagrees with his conclusions. 
I. THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON 
In 1868, after years of tension with the Republican Congress, 
Andrew Johnson, Lincoln’s successor (though from a different politi-
cal party), was impeached.10  Nine of the Articles of Impeachment 
dealt with Johnson’s violations of the Tenure in Office Act and 
Command of the Army Act for removing Secretary of War Edwin T. 
Stanton without the consent of the Senate.11  The tenth accused the 
President of bringing Congress into disgrace, ridicule, contempt and 
reproach.12  The eleventh article was an omnibus charge essentially 
accusing the President of violating the Take Care Clause of the Con-
stitution.13  After the trial before the Senate, which began March 23, 
 
4 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 11.  As Leibowitz’s book concentrates on Presidential im-
peachment, this review will not discuss judicial impeachments. 
5 Id. at 10. 
6 Id. at 5. 
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  Id. 
8 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 7. 
9 Id. at 9-10. 
10 Id. at 107. 
11 Id. at 112. 
12 Id. at 112-13. 
13 VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 235; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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1868 and lasted until May 16, 1868, Johnson was acquitted by one 
vote.14  With less than ten months left in office, Johnson served out 
the rest of his term.15 
While Leibowitz faithfully lays out the policy differences be-
tween President Andrew Johnson and the Fortieth Congress, in my 
estimation he understates the wrong-headedness of Johnson’s posi-
tions as well as the long run damage he caused the United States. 
After the Civil War ended, the devastated Southern States en-
acted Black Codes, which, while providing some rights for the freed 
slaves (such as legalized marriage), denied others (such as, the right 
to vote, to serve on juries and to testify in court against whites).16  
Some of the Black Codes declared that those who failed to sign year-
ly labor contracts could be arrested and hired out to whites.17  Fugi-
tives from labor were to be arrested and carried back to their employ-
ers.  Some states banned land ownership by African-Americans.  The 
Black Codes represented a concerted effort by whites to restore the 
master-servant relationship, to replace slavery with peonage.18 
At issue were the terms which the United States would insist 
upon before allowing the conquered and devastated states of the Con-
federacy back into the Union they once had fought to leave, but now 
sought to return.  The central issue between the President and the 
Congress was the degree to which the Union would use its leverage 
to see that the freed slaves would have the same rights as other Amer-
ican citizens (including the right to vote), land reform (so the freed-
men could earn a living), as well as the degree of protection the 
Northern army would give them so that they would not become vic-
tims of violence. 
The United States government had important leverage in two 
respects.  It could set the terms for readmission to the Union of the 
 
14 Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and 
Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859, 883 (1999). 
15 Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2093, 2131 (2002). 
16 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship 
Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 311 (2000). 
17 Donna J. King, The War on Women’s Fundamental Rights: Connecting U.S. Supreme 
Court Originalism to Rightwing, Conservative Extremism in American Politics, 19 CARDOZO 
J. L & GENDER 99, 114 n.65 (2012). 
18 See, e.g., 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 492-94 (3d ed. 2011); CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
THE BLACK AMERICAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 217-25 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. 
Zangrando eds., 1970). 
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seceded states, and it had the power to pardon or not to pardon those 
Southerners who had aided and abetted the war.  At first, the states of 
the former Confederacy had no leverage, but over time they were 
able to trade on the great desire in the North and West for re-union. 
Johnson sought unity for the nation, but not equality for for-
mer slaves.  He used his veto power frequently, vetoing, for example, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which wrote into federal law rights to 
contract, own property, and serve on juries.19  After the law was 
passed over his veto, Johnson emasculated its enforcement.  Con-
gress’s attempt to enlarge the scope of the work of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau to care for the freed slaves and to let them work and later own 
abandoned lands in the South was greatly weakened by Johnson’s 
opposition.  He resisted giving effect to even the anemic bill, which 
also became law over his veto.  Johnson at one point portrayed black 
suffrage as “worse than the military despotism under which [the 
southern states] . . . are now suffering.”20  That was a matter that he 
wished to leave to re-empowered Southern whites.21 
A strict constructionist where federal power was involved, 
Johnson was a very loose constructionist where Presidential power 
was concerned, often not “tak[ing] [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”22  He used the Presidential veto power far more than 
any previous President; he also made blanket use of the President’s 
power to pardon, refused to try former rebels, dispensed with oaths of 
loyalty to the Union, and refused to exclude former Confederates 
from political office.23 
Johnson’s Presidency was indeed a “catastrophe.”  As Van 
Tassel and Finkelman have written, “By any measure he was truly the 
wrong man in the wrong place, at the wrong time.”24  Rigid, thin-
skinned, humorless and lacking ability to compromise, Johnson swift-
ly alienated nearly the entire Republican Party.25  Post-1954 histori-
 
19 Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2011). 
20 MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 75 (1973) 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
23 VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 223. 
24 Id. at 222. 
25 See HOWARD MEANS, THE AVENGER TAKES HIS PLACE: ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE 45 
DAYS THAT CHANGED THE NATION 228 (2006) (showing Johnson’s unwillingness to com-
promise); BENEDICT, supra note 20, at 8 (describing President Johnson as inept). 
4
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ans have criticized his Presidency harshly.26  The website of the Uni-
versity of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs calls Johnson 
“the greatest failure of all Presidents in making a satisfying and just 
peace.”27  He is viewed, it states, as “a rigid, dictatorial racist who 
was unable to compromise or to accept a political reality at odds with 
his own ideas” and was “principally responsible for the failure of Re-
construction to solve the race problem in the South and perhaps in 
America as well.”28 
On the whole, Leibowitz does not heavily criticize the con-
duct of the impeachment trial.29  This is in accord with modern 
thought.  If what was at stake was tantamount to a vote of confidence 
in a parliamentary regime, at the least the swing voters saw the trial 
itself, Chief Justice Rehnquist has written, as “an essentially judicial 
proceeding.”30  Even though Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase who pre-
sided was, as was his habit, angling for a Presidential nomination, the 
trial was not conducted in a circus atmosphere and the Senate was not 
a “kangaroo court.”  Indeed, thirty of the fifty-four senators filed 
written opinions “explain[ing] their view of the proceedings and why 
they had voted the way they did.”31  That the President was spared 
conviction by a single vote was due in some measure to principle, to 
the fact that the statute the President was accused of violating was 
 
26 Sanford V. Levinson, New Perspectives on the Reconstruction Court, 26 STAN. L. REV. 
461, 465-67 (1974) (book review) (“Johnson was shown to have been an obdurate man, in-
competent as a politician, who was basically a racist, willing to accept the South back into 
the Union so long as the Southern States recognized merely that the formal institution of 
slavery was a thing of the past.”). 
27 American President: A Reference Resource: Impact and Legacy, MILLER CENTER, 
http://Millercenter.org/President/Johnson/essays/biography/9 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
28 Id.  At one time, when the sympathies of historians were engaged with the prostrate 
South and Congressional Republicans were viewed as vengeful and vindictive, Johnson was 
to be found in the middle rank of Presidents because of his courage in challenging the usur-
pation of Congressional authority.  Eric Foner, He’s the Worst Ever, WASH. POST, (Dec. 3, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/01/AR2006120101509.html.  
During and after the “Second Reconstruction,” the period in which the constitutional rights 
of African-Americans were finally recognized, Johnson plunged in the rankings.  Id.  In 
1948, a poll of scholars ranked him nineteenth of Presidents.  ROBERT W. MERRY, WHERE 
THEY STAND: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS IN THE EYES OF VOTERS AND HISTORIANS 244 
(2012).  By 2005, he was ranked thirty-seventh (of forty) just above Franklin Pierce, Warren 
Harding and James Buchanan.  Id. at 245. 
29 See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 111-12 (arguing that Johnson’s impeachment was “le-
galistic”). 
30 REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 245. 
31 Id. at 240. 
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“opaque,”32 as well as the result of antagonism to the tactics of the 
House managers, antipathy to Senator Benjamin Wade, who would 
have succeeded to the Presidency, and finally, to the fact that the 
President was so politically crippled that it was unlikely he would 
cause much harm in his last year in office.33 
Leibowitz is not unaware of the deep policy differences be-
tween the Congress and President Johnson, nor is he excessively 
sympathetic to the President.  Nevertheless, although Leibowitz pref-
aces this opinion with “[s]ome have argued,” it seems to this reviewer 
that this is his, Leibowitz’s, view as well—that the conflict was over 
“an effort by the Radical[] [Republicans] . . . to gain long-term con-
trol over the government” for decades to come by obtaining in the 
South a political structure that was theirs.34  He sees the Tenure of 
Office Act as a pretext (which many believe was true).35 
The Tenure of Office Act may have been a “pretext” for some 
and the impeachment process carried with it high political stakes, but 
that does not mean that the battle was unwarranted and the policy 
stakes insignificant.36  At issue was the direction of the nation imme-
diately upon the conclusion of a catastrophic civil war. 
Profound issues were at stake.  Had the Confederate states left 
the Union and, therefore, was their status that of “conquered provinc-
es?”  Could conditions be placed on the seceding states for 
(re)admission to the Union?  Should former Confederates be treated 
as traitors?  Had slavery been abolished simply to end up with anoth-
er Missouri Compromise?  In other words, after over 600,000 deaths, 
was the nation which had been “half-slave and half-free,” going to 
become one where African-Americans had some rights in one part of 
the country and remain a subjugated class in the other?  Would the 
former slaves be protected by the federal government or would they 
have to survive on the scraps of liberty doled out to them by the 
Southern white plantation elite? 
 
32 Professor Benedict states that the impeachment “turned largely on the construction of a 
law the language of which had been purposely obfuscated to satisfy the demands of both the 
Senate and the House without appearing to require a concession by either.”  BENEDICT, supra 
note 20, at 140.  The law would be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United 
States fifty-eight years later.  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 295 (1926). 
33 BENEDICT, supra note 20, at 137; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 227-28; VAN 
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 226-27. 
34 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 130-31. 
35 Id. at 131. 
36 Id. 
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There were also extraordinarily important separation of pow-
ers questions connected to the impeachment battle.  May a President 
refuse to faithfully execute laws?  May the President “judicially” de-
termine the validity of every enactment of Congress, effectively re-
pealing or at least ignoring them at his pleasure?37  Must the branch 
charged by the Constitution with making the laws automatically give 
way when the President refuses to execute a law or laws? 
The questions at issue in the Johnson impeachment process 
were great questions, some of the greatest that have confronted the 
American republic.  This episode was not “politics as usual,” nor was 
it just an attempt by Congress to remove an “accidental President.”  
Not only were great issues at stake, but the proceedings in the Senate 
were, at least in part, a great legal case in which “a political officer 
[was given] a full and fair trial in a time of political crisis.”38  Perhaps 
it would have been better had the House of Representatives not em-
ployed the short hand of violation of the Tenure of Office Act in its 
charges, but instead had “detailed Johnson’s [misfeasance and] mal-
feasance in office, his obstruction of congressional policy, and his 
high-handed unilateral actions.”39 
In the short run, Johnson survived and was unable to do any 
real harm to Reconstruction during his remaining months in office.  
But, Johnson’s policies already had the effect of converting “a con-
quered people, bitter but ready to accept the consequences of defeat, 
into a hostile, aggressive, uncooperative unit.”40  He had restored to 
the Southern elite much of its pre-war “political and economic power 
and through that power domination of the men and women they had 
recently held as slaves.”41  Precious time was lost.  Reconstruction 
was set back two full years and eventually Northern public opinion 
lost interest.42  Reconstruction was over by 1877. 
Leibowitz believes that the President’s conviction would not 
have been enough to have made Reconstruction a success for the 
freedman.43  Perhaps he’s right, but without Johnson a much stronger 
 
37 VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 247. 
38 BENEDICT, supra note 20, at 143. 
39 VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 225. 
40 BENEDICT, supra note 20, at 49. 
41 Id. at 49. 
42 Id. at 107-08. 
43 See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 129-30 (“Whether Hayes or Tilden became President, 
the country didn’t want military reconstruction to continue; and without it, no matter who 
was President, it didn’t look like the legal interpretation that was desired could be ob-
7
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effort would have been made.  Not only Johnson’s policies, but the 
Southern elite also won the battle and it remained the victor for over 
eighty years.  The result haunts us still. 
II. THE NIXON IMPEACHMENT EFFORT 
For Mr. Leibowitz, the impeachment process involving Rich-
ard Nixon was too partisan and too damaging for the nation.44  He 
takes this position while relating quite well the story of the cover-up 
of the Watergate burglary (encompassing at the highest level lying to 
law enforcement and to the American people, withholding evidence, 
suborning perjury, and paying hush money) and the involvement of 
Nixon and those close to him in illegal acts in other realms (the mis-
use of the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and Republican Party for harassment of political opponents; in-
volvement in illegal surveillance as well as stimulating and sanction-
ing “dirty tricks” in the 1972 Presidential campaign).45 
Leibowitz relates all of this, but implies that the investigations 
of Nixon and the impeachment process were simply a part of a bitter 
power struggle between the President and Congress and the Demo-
cratic Party over Nixon’s intentions to substantially reduce the size of 
the federal government and restructure and limit it.46 
There is another perspective, which is somewhat beyond 
Leibowitz’s concern, but worth mentioning here.  That is to remind 
the reader of the unconstitutional and extra-constitutional behavior of 
the Nixon Administration during its first term in office, before its 
plan to reshape the federal government was a real threat, if indeed it 
ever was.  During that period, federal judges appointed by the Presi-
dent of both parties had struck down, often on constitutional grounds, 
such actions as the dragnet arrests of antiwar demonstrators;47 ex-
treme claims of executive privilege;48 exemptions from the Freedom 
 
tained.”). 
44 See id. at 134-35, 137 (comparing the Nixon impeachment to that of Johnson’s). 
45 Id. at 134. 
46 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 134-35, 137. 
47 Sullivan v. Murphy, 444 F.2d 840, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  Where the three-judge panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit included a Nixon appointee 
as well as the former number two person of the FBI.  Id. 
48 See Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783,788 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Mink v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.2d 742, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (both decisions were 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/7
2013]  REVIEW: WHY THE PROCESS WENT WRONG 593 
of Information Act49 and of course, the attempt to prevent the Wash-
ington Post from running a series of articles on the origin and conduct 
of the Vietnam War.50  As the Watergate scandal began accelerating 
in 1973, federal judges continued to overturn the actions of the Nixon 
Administration on constitutional grounds.51 
Leibowitz repeats what I would call the “Così fan tutte” de-
fense,52 one often heard during the years of Watergate, that the illegal 
and unconstitutional activities of the Nixon Administration were not 
unique, and that many of the same activities had occurred in previous 
administrations.53  But, while some of Nixon’s predecessors had en-
gaged in secret wiretaps or misused the Internal Revenue Service or 
violated other laws, the number of illegal acts in such a diversity of 
fields and the number of high officials who committed them were 
(and are) unprecedented.54 
As with the Andrew Johnson impeachment, Leibowitz tends 
to belittle the motives and abilities of those supporting impeachment 
even though their conduct regarding their public duties brought out 
the truth and led to Nixon’s downfall.55  He considers the breadth for 
the charter of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox “extraordinary,” “the 
size of his staff . . . staggering,” and asks “[o]n what basis” Cox could 
organize his office “so that Watergate was only a portion—a small 
portion—of his effort?”56  The basis was, of course, prior public reve-
lations of improper conduct, which had been unconvincingly denied 
 
per curiam).  Id. at 743; Seaborg, 463 F.2d at 784. 
49 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Nixon appointee on pan-
el). 
50 United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (1971), aff’d, 403 U.S. 713 
(1971). 
51 See JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY 
OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 244-263 (2001).  For a broader dis-
cussion of the Nixon Administration’s litigation before the lower federal courts, see general-
ly STANLEY I. KUTER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 
(1990). 
52 Thomas Kemp, Getting to Grips with Mozart’s Così Fan Tutte, GRAMOPHONE (June 1, 
2012), http://www.gramophone.co.uk/blog/gramophone-guest-blog/getting-to-grips-with-
mozarts-cos%C3%AC-fan-tutte (Mozart’s great opera, “Così fan tutte” is often translated: 
“They are all like that”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 342. 
54 See id. at 341-42, 344 (explaining that the rationale of “national security” was also used 
often and loosely). 
55 See id. at 128-29, 134-35 (“[T]he Nixon impeachment was a dispute between the Con-
gress and the Executive over the proper governance of the country similar, if far more subtle, 
to the Andrew Johnson impeachment dispute almost a century before.”). 
56 Id. at 253-55. 
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by the White House and its supporters.  Leibowitz queries “[w]hether 
Cox was a hero” for not accepting the compromise proposed by the 
White House permitting the elderly Senator John Stennis, and Stennis 
alone, to listen to subpoenaed taped conversations, compare them to 
the actual recordings, and then submit a verified transcript of the re-
cordings to Judge John J. Sirica.57  He wonders whether in refusing 
the “Stennis compromise,” Cox had “missed an opportunity to save 
[his] country a tremendously divisive process”?58 
Certainly Leibowitz is not the first to term Judge Sirica “over-
zealous” and his preliminary sentencing of the Watergate burglars 
“outrageous,”59 and perhaps that was so, although certainly one or 
two good words might have been found for the performance of a man 
who by his overall conduct of the Watergate prosecutions perhaps 
best exemplifies the meaning of an independent judiciary.60  It takes 
Leibowitz but one sentence to diminish the reputations of the chairs 
of the two Congressional committees, Sam Ervin and Peter Rodino, 
which educated the nation about the real meaning of separation of 
powers.  Leibowitz puts it this way: “Like [Sam] Ervin in the Senate, 
[Peter Rodino] was a man who was notable for being undistin-
guished.”61  Even the work of the Special Counsel to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, John Doar, one of America’s great 
American public servants, is dismissed.  Leibowitz writes that, alt-
hough Doar’s summation “would be hailed at the time as overwhelm-
ingly persuasive, after a passage of time, except for Watergate, the 
substantive case is extremely weak.”62 
While finding no heroes among those whose work contributed 
to the drive to impeach Nixon, Leibowitz does give a relatively bal-
anced picture of the events of the Watergate period.63  Yet, he has 
tilted the scales by giving considerable weight to those (few) who see 
Watergate simply as a contest for power between Congress and the 
 
57 Id. at 277. 
58 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 277. 
59 Id. at 223, 233. 
60 See id. at 234-35 (“Sirica’s sentence was designed to force a confession.  However 
much such a sentence appealed to Sirica, whose integrity and earnestness were unquestioned, 
it cannot be done in the United States. . . .  A judge cannot sentence a criminal to life impris-
onment to get him to inform on others.  Why Sirica thought he could is bewildering.”). 
61 Id. at 289. 
62 Id. at 303. 
63 See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 178-82 (recounting Watergate). 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/7
2013]  REVIEW: WHY THE PROCESS WENT WRONG 595 
President.64  The Nixon impeachment was not a mere dispute over the 
subpoena of a few documents or tapes.  Nor was it simply a partisan 
battle.  The central judicial figure had been a conservative Republi-
can.  The central figure in the Senate, Sam Ervin, was a conservative 
Southern Democrat whose views were probably closer to the Nixon 
Administration than to Northern and Western Democratic liberals.65  
The critical votes for impeachment in the House Judiciary Committee 
came from Republicans crossing party lines and Southern Democrats 
whose views were probably not far from Ervin’s.  No reasonable per-
son could view the impeachable offenses approved by the House Ju-
diciary Committee as justified by “national security.” 
III. THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT 
One can hardly disagree with Leibowitz’s description of the 
impeachment of Bill Clinton as partisan and trivial.66  Substantively, 
it is hardly worth the 180 pages the author gives to it, but it is a good 
story told well.67  Leibowitz takes us through a number of unproven 
or trivial scandals: Whitewater, Travelgate, the sexual harassment of 
Paula Jones, the suicide of Vincent Foster and, of course, the saga of 
the President and the intern.68  He does not even neglect the final co-
da, long after the impeachment battle was over—the pardons issued 
by Clinton during the last days of his administration.69 
For Bill Clinton’s impeachment, the House of Representatives 
cobbled together a number of offenses connected with the Special 
Prosecutor’s investigations of Clinton’s sexual behavior and attached 
to them—not entirely wrongly—labels such as perjury, obstruction of 
justice, and abuse of power.70  The House of Representatives, with 
overwhelmingly partisan votes, adopted as impeachable offenses per-
jury to a grand jury and obstruction of justice, two offenses for which 
Clinton was investigated.71  If, in the case of Nixon the facts were 
long at issue (although ultimately they became clear), with Clinton 
 
64 Id. at 183. 
65 Id. at 135. 
66 See id. at 420 (arguing that the Republicans controlled both the House of Representa-
tives, as well as the Senate). 
67 Id. at 367-547. 
68 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 373-450. 
69 Id. at 541. 
70 Id. at 474-75. 
71 Id. at 512. 
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the facts were clear; the issue was whether his conduct met the con-
stitutional standard of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”72  Efforts to 
limit this silly, partisan battle through the use of a censure motion, 
coupled with a financial penalty, were made by Presidents Gerald 
Ford and Jimmy Carter and by a bi-partisan group of six Senators.73  
They failed, at least in part, because of Clinton’s refusal to admit to 
perjury.74  But, they also failed because the public was able to distin-
guish quite well between Clinton’s personal failings, of which they 
did not approve, and Clinton’s performance of his public duties, of 
which they did.75 
The Clinton experience is and will be a precedent for the 
proposition that the impeachment process should not be easy to use.  
The bar should be set high and the remedy employed only to deal 
with public wrongdoing.76  The charges against Clinton involved per-
jury in a civil suit on a collateral matter and lying to a grand jury to 
cover up a sexual dalliance.77  Although the evidence against him 
could have been used to argue lack of fitness for office and violation 
of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, the charges were simply 
too distant from abuse of office.78  “[I]mpeachable conduct, whether 
criminal or not, [ought to arise] from, or relate to, or . . . have a direct 
substantial effect on[] the execution of the public responsibilities of 
the president.”79  In the Clinton case, the misconduct lay, as historian 
Jack Rakove said, “at the far boundaries of what might be considered 
impeachable.”80  In the end, half of the Senate accepted a central ar-
gument of the President’s attorneys—that the remedy was dispropor-
tionate to the sin.  “Clinton’s omissions, half-truths, and apparent lies 
about his personal sexual conduct simply [were] not the stuff of high 
 
72 Id. at 479; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
73 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 480. 
74 Id. at 479-84, 517, 522; KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON V. 
STARR 611 (2010). 
75 BROWN, supra note 3, at 115.  The 1998 Congressional elections ended with the strong-
est “showing of an incumbent president’s party since 1934.”  Id. at 114. 
76 See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 486 (discussing why the House decided to impeach 
Clinton). 
77 Id. at 486-87. 
78 BROWN, supra note 3, at 91. 
79 Id. at 115. 
80 Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 249-
50 (1999) (statement of Jack N. Rakove, Stanford University Coe Professor of History and 
American Studies), quoted in BROWN, supra note 3, at 104. 
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crimes and misdemeanors within the contemplation of the Fram-
ers.”81 
At least the trial in the Senate was relatively dignified.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist presided without partisanship and in the end Clin-
ton did receive tangible punishment of a sort, although not from Con-
gress.82  He was found in contempt of court and signed a consent or-
der accepting a five-year suspension of his law license.83 
IV. IMPEACHMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
This observer does not disagree with the author regarding the 
inappropriateness of impeachment in the case of President Clinton.  
He does, however, strongly disagree with the prescription that im-
peachment generally should be laid upon the shelf.  It may well be 
that once the impeachment process is set in motion, partisan tensions 
are amplified.  It may also be that the impeachment process inevita-
bly becomes a struggle for power between the legislative and execu-
tive branches.  However, to dismiss impeachment entirely as a consti-
tutional check against the head of the executive branch in an age of 
“imperial presidents” would be folly. 
Leibowitz believes partisanship is bad.84  He is not wrong in 
finding no indication that the Framers anticipated how great partisan-
ship in the impeachment process might become.85  This is no surprise 
since many of the Framers wished to avoid political parties.  Nor can 
one deny that, in the period we are living through, partisanship has 
risen to an unhealthy level.  Yet, it must not be forgotten that the two 
great, national parties remain at the core of the American republic; 
that it is through them that “the people” choose the direction their na-
tion will take as well as those who will hold high office.  In many re-
spects, political parties are the nation’s fundamental tools for gov-
ernmental accountability.  Even if extreme partisanship can be a 
cause of impeachment battles, it certainly was not the only and prob-
ably not the major cause of the Johnson and Nixon impeachment ef-
forts. 
Even though, as Raoul Berger wrote two generations ago, 
 
81 BROWN, supra note 3, at 121. 
82 Id. at 122. 
83 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 542. 
84 Id. at 548. 
85 Id. at 550. 
13
Morris: Review:  Why the Process Went Wrong
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
598 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
“’Twas ever thus; impeachment was ‘essentially a political weapon’ 
from its inception in 1388;”86 nevertheless, one can act politically 
without being partisan in a narrow sense.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
studying the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President 
Andrew Johnson before he was called upon to preside over Clinton’s, 
asked whether the dominant role played by political parties made the 
Senate a partisan tribunal, and answered, “Remarkably, in each of 
these two cases, the answer to that question proved to be no.”87 
That the impeachment process was harmful to the nation may 
have been true of the Clinton impeachment.  In Nixon’s case, the 
harm of having a crippled President must be weighed against the 
evils his administration had done and the lesson the nation received 
in constitutionalism.  It remains an important reminder to future pres-
idents.  In Andrew Johnson’s case, the President’s unwillingness to 
enforce important laws at a crucial time provoked the impeachment.88  
In that sense, the Johnson impeachment was tantamount to a vote of 
confidence in a parliamentary regime. 
Another of Leibowitz’s concerns (and those of many others) 
is the vagueness of the constitutional standard, “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”89  Inevitably, impeachers argue for a broad standard 
for impeachment, while supporters of the President contend for a 
standard of criminal behavior akin to treason and bribery committed 
in the performance of official duties.  Of course, ambiguities in the 
clauses of the United States Constitution are hardly limited to the im-
peachment clause in Article 2, section 4.90  Ordinarily, ambiguities in 
the Constitution are resolved by the courts, although sometimes a 
long period of practice by the other branches serves as a constitution-
al precedent.  In the case of impeachment, it can be argued that the 
three experiences with Presidential impeachment have yielded an ac-
ceptable standard—impeachment should occur when there are Presi-
 
86 H.R. 93-7, 93d Congress (1973) (enacted) (quoting M. V. Clarke, The Origin of Im-
peachment, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY 184 (Frederick Maurice Powicke ed., 
1934)). 
87 REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 277.  John Quincy Adams, however, described the Justice 
Samuel Chase trial as “a party prosecution.”  Id. at 107. 
88 BROWN, supra note 3, at 120. 
89 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 115-16. 
90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 1-2 (The im-
peachment clause “must remain ambiguous, for in the end the legitimacy of the impeach-
ment process and the outcome of impeachment trials remain deeply tied to the politics and 
the social context of the particular time in which individual cases arise.”). 
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dential actions “predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible 
with either the constitutional form and principles of our government 
or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the presidential 
office.”91  This would include mal-administration, misfeasance and 
malfeasance in office.92  As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 
65, impeachment was to be a remedy for offenses “which may with 
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL” and which arise 
“from the abuse or violation of some public trust.”93 
While impeachment may not require the president to have 
committed a crime, neither should it be used for petty misconduct.94  
As H. Lowell Brown points out, “an impeachable high crime and 
misdemeanor must be a breach of faith with the Constitution that is 
so egregious and so exigent that rather than allowing the electorate to 
do so in an election, the president must be ejected from office imme-
diately by the Congress . . . .”95  This means “constitutional wrongs 
that subvert the structure of government . . . and even the Constitu-
tion itself . . . .”96  By that standard, Nixon clearly qualified and An-
drew Johnson probably did.  Clinton did not. 
Leibowitz argues that none of the three Presidential im-
peachments were “worth it in terms of the damage done to the Presi-
dency and the body politic.”97  He writes of a country torn apart, of a 
government badly distracted.98  He suggests that in the Nixon and 
Clinton cases impeachment weakened the stature of the United States 
in international affairs and led each man to take actions that he prob-
ably would not have, had he not been facing impeachment.99  Essen-
tially, Leibowitz accepts Henry Kissinger’s argument that Moscow 
 
91 VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 49 (1974)). 
92 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-7, at 622.  The standard for judges, “Good Behavior” is different and 
not discussed at length in the Leibowitz book.  Raoul Berger states that the impeachment 
debate at the Constitutional Convention “was almost exclusively concerned with the Presi-
dent.”  Id. at 649. 
93 THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: BEING 
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION AGREED UPON 
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION: FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON 423 (n.d.). 
94 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-7, at 644-45. 
95 BROWN, supra note 3, at 123. 
96 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 9. 
98 Id. at 571. 
99 Id. at 572-79. 
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might not have “threatened unilateral military intervention in the 
Middle East [in October 1973,] if Nixon had been ‘a functioning 
President.’ ”100  He also points to Clinton’s ordering the bombing of 
suspected chemical, biological and nuclear lab sites in Iraq on the day 
Congress was to vote on his impeachment.101  Both presidents, he 
points out, took trips abroad to bolster their images.102  For 
Leibowitz, “the public interest in having a fully functioning President 
is so great that impeachment is rarely, if ever, wanted.”103 
In place of impeachment, Leibowitz would have Congress 
pass a resolution censuring the President, something it did with An-
drew Jackson (and later expunged), John Tyler, and James Knox 
Polk.104  He argues that “[c]ensure would be easier to accomplish, 
would be less divisive to the country, and would have a significant 
impact.”105  Oddly enough though, rather than looking to the possible 
restraining effect of censure on the rest of the presidencies of Jack-
son, Tyler, and Polk, Leibowitz looks to the effects of censure on 
seven of the nine occasions that the Senator censured one of its 
own.106  He finds that in those cases, the censured Senator’s political 
career ended at the next election.107 
It is hard to be convinced by this analogy.  First, three of 
those cases occurred when Senators were still being elected by state 
legislatures.  Second, the harm a single Senator can do to the nation 
by remaining in the Senate for the rest of his term is minimal.  Most 
certainly, the nation’s checks and balances are unlikely to be affected 
if a Senator remains in the Senate for a few years.  However, con-
signing the constitutional check of Presidential impeachment to the 
dustbin has far more troubling implications. 
Granted that for the past four years a highly partisan Congress 
has kept a President, seemingly unwilling to put up a pitched battle, 
hog-tied, at least in domestic matters.  Nevertheless, since 1933 there 
has been an extraordinary growth of Presidential power, which was 
particularly marked during the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson, 
 
100 Id. at 576 (quoting ROBERT DALLEK, NIXON AND KISSENGER: PARTNERS IN POWER 532 
(2007). 
101 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 579. 
102 Id. at 572-79. 
103 Id. at 7. 
104 Id. at 588; see VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 199-202. 
105 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1, at 588. 
106 Id. at 584-88. 
107 Id. at 585. 
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Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush.  Wars have 
been fought with limited Congressional sanction.  In the case of 
Cambodia, the President ordered sustained bombing of a neutral na-
tion and kept the matter secret.108  Intelligence activities have gone 
unchecked and illegal surveillance carried out for questionable rea-
sons of national security.  To strip Congress of impeachment as a 
weapon would further weaken the balance of powers that was per-
haps the most ingenious creation of the framers of the Constitution. 
The impeachment process is lengthy, cumbersome, inefficient 
and generally not desirable because it weakens the President and dis-
tracts the Congress, but it is a central weapon of accountability.  
However partisan and silly, the impeachment efforts aimed at Bill 
Clinton, Johnson, and Nixon were legitimately fought over important 
issues.  Andrew Johnson was frustrating the fulfillment of what had 
become, at least retroactively, one of the purposes of a war that had 
killed hundreds of thousands of Americans.  The President was refus-
ing to execute enormously important policies that had been made by 
the legislative branch.  The stakes for the future of the nation were 
great.  Perhaps in the end Johnson’s acquittal was not inappropriate, 
but the battle against him was warranted. 
The impeachment of Richard Nixon was aimed at a Presiden-
tial office that had grown enormously powerful, against a President 
insensitive, if not contemptuous, of the meaning of constitutional-
ism—that the President too is under the law.  He had committed seri-
ous felonies.  Criminal laws had been violated by his chief aides, 
members and former members of his Cabinet, and leaders of his po-
litical party.  Such behavior justified the application of the criminal 
law to those not holding the Presidential office.  In the case of the 
President, the remedy provided by the Constitution was more than 
appropriate—it was necessary. 
Thus, this reviewer disagrees strongly with Mr. Leibowitz’s 
prescriptions, although he greatly enjoyed his stimulating book and 
recommends it strongly for others, who then can judge for themselves 
whether they agree with the author or the reviewer. 
 
 
108 Id. at 219-20. 
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